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ABSTRACT
Space syntax has established itself as a significant field of research into architectural and urban
phenomena through the analysis of spatial configuration. Analyses that predominantly consist of
variations on modelling spatial configurations as systems of axial lines, segments, convex spaces or
isovists with further refinements. This analysis builds on the process of, as stated in the Social Logic
of Space, first making discrete units out of continuous space, so as to create a system that can be
analyzed, and then subjecting this system to analysis. The procedures of creating these discrete
systems have seen many iterations, lately often employing a range of processes to road center line
maps or similar existing geographical information or, increasingly dominantly for buildings, VGA
analysis where isovists are distributed evenly in a grid in the space subject to analysis. This has
allowed for more rapid analysis of larger sets of data and ostensibly less impact of human decisions in
constructing the analytic models. At the same time, theoretical developments have increasingly looked
to cognition to explain statistical results and to theorize the spatial units employed in syntactical
analysis. This work has been important for the field. However, some important questions still await
robust theoretical reconciliation. For instance, isovists, argued for as representation of vision, are
employed both to analyze visibility and accessibility while the scale and type of object or material
boundary that is considered a boundary in an axial line or convex space map varies. This article does
not strive to provide a final resolution to these challenges, but discusses and refines the theoretical
basis to provide potential paths forward. In this discussion, the article compares spatial configuration
as the understanding of the combination of construction of pre-defined entities to spatial configuration
as the result of subdivision and articulation of spatial differentiation in several ways, which
incorporates cognition as an active faculty that operates in relation to intent and background of
whomever is concerned, but also allows to consider the potential of different cultures embedded in
cognition through notions of salience and articulation. It suggests that some of the difficulties in
finding a clear-cut definition of e.g. ‘convex space’ lies in that rather than a geometric property of
‘space’, one might look to their formation and articulation by material boundaries as culturally and
situationally conditioned. This allows for a more dynamic yet not completely relativistic theoretical
ground for developing analytic modelling further and meeting challenges that are yet theoretically
unresolved.
KEYWORDS
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1. INTRODUCTION
Space syntax has established itself as a significant field of research with a wide array of findings
related to a core investigation of the role of spatial configuration in various ranges of individual,
social, cultural, economic, and other processes. In this research, modelling ‘space’ in ways that via
transformation of more or less continuous space into discrete units for study as graphs has been a
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central strategy, where the method of analysing these graphs increasingly lies in mathematical
analysis related to systems theory. One can even argue that the particular translation(s) from ‘space’ to
‘graph’ is what enables a large part of the findings of the field in that it allows for qualitative and
correlational testing of hypothesis as well as investigative work.
Translation from material space to graph is not a trivial matter, however, and making discursive what
constitutes ‘space’ for the purpose of analysis has been central, where interdependency of social and
spatial relations is key (Hillier and Hanson, 1984). This differentiates the fieldfrom many other graph-
or diagram-based models (e.g. March and Steadman, 1971; Klein, 1927; Leuder, 2017; Alexander,
1964). While translations have been developed in several ways (e.g. Hillier et al., 2012, Peponis et al.,
1997; 1998; Hillier and Hanson 1984) and continuous refinements are made (Morello and Ratti, 2009;
Bhatia et al., 2013; Varoudis and Psarra, 2014; Hwang 2013), one might note a tendency towards
convergence to a particular subset of models, methods and techniques and a tendency to make slightly
too quick links between theoretical arguments and applied models. In many practical situations this
might not pose a problem, but for the field’s development it is important to closely examine and refine
theoretical aspect not only of space-society or space-individual links, but of the particular role of the
analytical spatial models and their translations from built form.
However, while there is continuous theoretical refinement in the field, there is unresolved terrain
between the theoretical discussions examining and explaining the models and models used (or made)
in practice, and, conversely, between the way models are made in practice and their common
theoretical explanation. This article intends to explore this unresolved territory. To a certain extent
this requires deconstruction of both theory and practice, which always runs the risk of a sort of
Derridean dead-end or, as does Tafuri’s (1968) investigations, to end up with that since all positions
can be questioned no position is possible. While not engaging with the general validity of such
arguments, they clearly suggest the importance to more firmly establish links between theoretical
positions and modelling practices. Following such a line of reasoning, the target here is to move
theory towards a firmer discursive ground for analytic modelling practice. The intent is thus not to
‘solve’ modelling in practice but to refine and develop the theoretical basis of the particular link
between the geometry of space and the configurational models of analysis.
Through examining theoretical and practical challenges and refining links between modes of
translations and theoretical positioning, it will be suggested that rather than insisting on particular
models as ‘better’ or ‘worse’, questions of which type of model and the definitions and decisions in its
making works better must be distinctly tied to research query and situation. This, it will be argued,
necessitates theory that makes explicit not only modelling decisions in practice but their relation to
theoretical positions and consequences, and relations of theoretical ‘ideals’ to limitations and
possibilities intrinsic to models and modelling practices. This must be done critically and with care, as
it is important to not confuse ‘highest correlation’ with ‘best theory’ prematurely, as that would lead
towards the simple case that, as we know, a model that is made directly after observed socio-spatial
practice will best correlate to this socio-spatial practice but essentially be a tautological rather than an
analytic model.
It must also be acknowledged that the argument comes from a theoretical position as well as a
position on the purpose of modelling is (e.g. Downes, 2011; McCarty, 2008; Marshall et al., 2018).
This position is one from architecture, which in some respects deviates from one of, for instance,
environmental psychology or geography. A differentiation I believe to be best clarified through the
coming discussion. And while I acknowledge that the fields are interlinked, the difference can be
crucial as it brings the particular state of architecture as having been made into play.
Finally, the type of argument to come necessitates drawing out and extrapolating tendencies to
highlight differences and challenges. My intentions in simplifying is thus not to neglect all the
important work performed, but to distill what questions are at stake. It is also not the intent to simply
criticize the field for developing largely through learning in and from practice—I will argue the
contrary. It is, however, critique in the sense that it intends to raise questions of theoretical and
methodological positions and the links made between analytic models and empirical findings.
2. OUTLINING SOME CHALLENGES
As Bafna (2005) points out, the analytical models in space syntax concern a particular take on what
one might call ‘material architectural space’. That is, in a wider context space can validly be discussed
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in a range of different ways, where the particular notion of how it is organized by material boundaries
is decidedly architectural (Peponis, 2005; Marcus et al., 2013). This means that the field investigates
geometries in the sense that while the analyses are ‘a-geometric’ (though topology is a form of
geometry) and it can be argued that the geometry of spaces are not subject to syntactic analysis, this is
only partially true as the definition of the topological units of analysis derive from the geometrical
shape of their material boundary. Sophia Psarra formulates is as that
“[…] integration is influenced by varying degrees of geometric control on the patterns of
visual information. Spatial configuration is dependent on the relative placement of physical
elements. But in spite of coordinating axial lines, convex spaces, isovists and their
interconnections, form in space syntax is buried under the notion of depth and changes of
direction.” (Psarra, 2010, p.22)
From this point of view, one can see remarkably little discussion lately that focuses particularly on the
translation from built form in the sense of the material acts that shape boundaries of ‘space’ to spatial
units in a graph. One can find work that concern relations between analytical models and cognition in
several aspects (Peponis, 2012; Hillier, 2012; Hillier and Iida, 2015; Marcus, 2018; Dalton, 2005;
Emo, 2017; Koch, 2005; 2012), but also on modelling practice and how to measure, for instance,
distance and other aspects of subsequent analysis (Stavroulaki et al., 2017; Figueiredo, 2015; Jiang
and Claramunt, 2004; Peponis et al., 2008; Turner, 2003; 2009; etc.). These have different approaches
in many aspects, but by and large they share the general approach of comparing maps ‘as they are’,
and the overall discussion tends to concern moderating the degree of unit aggregation, the measures of
‘distance’, or the formulae to calculate centrality (or other mathematical concepts).1 When they do
address the theory-model-reality relation they tend to do it on the level of basic principles. As an
example, the use of RCL maps instead of axial maps to produce segments is verified by that above
certain scales they generate statistically correlating measures, or correlate statistically equally well to
pedestrian movement flow counts, which is subsequently used as validation for making use of the
theoretical foundation of one as argument for the other (Turner, 2005; 2009; Krenz, 2017). This is
more or less a test of situated robustness between models (Sugden, 2000), which rather than showing
interchangeability demonstrate that they can serve in place of one-another within contexts and for
queries for which the test of robustness is valid; i.e. where the correlation supports that results of the
research inquiry at hand would not significantly deviate depending on which of the models is used.
The inquiry here concerns how decisions constantly need to be made when creating the models
‘themselves’; inclusion or exclusion of roads without pedestrian access, how to model complicated
intersections or highly trafficked roads, what kind and scale of boundaries or objects break axiality,
and so on—or how to balance ‘probable’ versus ‘possible’ in the colloquial ‘lines that people can see
and move along’ definition of axial lines. One might argue comparatively few axial maps follow the
stricter geometric definitions generally used in theoretical arguments for the basis of their validity.
This has of course not been just ignored; rather there are a few practices of drawing axial maps
developed which are commonly employed, and while I argue that they have not been theorized this is
not the same as that they have not been discussed and critically examined. These practices are based
on combinations of informed reasoning, theoretical principles (grounded or hypothesized), and
principles inferred from observations. In this sense most manually drawn configurational graphs
balance between testing principles (deriving models from distinctly theoretical principles to see how
they relate to observed phenomena) and learning from observed practice (adapting what constitutes a
boundary from what people are observed to treat as a boundary), which is also true for ostensibly
automated graphs such as the VGA graph that requires preparation of drawings and decisions of what
objects to include as boundary definitions. The challenge is to theorize this productive diversity of
modelling practices that currently operates as a non-discursive ‘glue’ in the field, rather than striving
to reduce these in order to enforce a particular modelling orthodoxy.
An interlinked challenge is that spatial models by default are quite precise. By this I do not mean that
they measure precisely what one tries to find out, but that in order to do a spatial analysis the model
becomes precise in its internal definition. Where and how points, lines, paths, boundaries or other
elements are distributed gain a certain specificity due to decisions embedded in the model’s
construction. Some of these challenges include specifically geometries and the formulation of space
1 We need to distinguish here between, for instance, if an angular deviation in a model should be considered or not (e.g.
continuity, threshold) and if the model should include the boundary that generated the angular deviation in the model to begin
with. This question cannot be resolved within a model but reside in modelling practice and construction rather than operations
on any given model.
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and boundary, as in the often referred to criticism by Ratti (2004), but also how the definition of
convex space leaves a number of plans impossible to resolve (Penn et al., 1997; Miranda and Koch,
2013). Even though geometries that lead to these challenges, as argued in Hillier and Penn’s rejoinder
(2004), rarely occur in reality, some of the challenges remain unanswered. Whether models of for
instance park environments should follow the assigned pedestrian paths or be allowed to pass over
grass surfaces remains an unresolved territory of discrepancy between theory and practice, and use of
RCL does not resolve these challenges as it simply shifts the hands of making these decisions.
Similarly, there have been attempts to resolve the challenges of convex space definitions but the
theoretical-geometrical grounds for a wide and solid practice of generating informative justified
graphs remains unresolved.
Pointing out these challenges is not questioning whether spatial configuration and modelling thereof
holds social and cultural significance. My position is that we with certainty can say that configuration
matters. The way space is organized by material boundaries has effect, and is both directly and
metaphorically linked to spatial cognition, social organization, cultural values and economic processes.
The models developed are informative and descriptive in a range of ways and for a range of research
questions. There is definitely more to learn on these questions as well. This is not the question. The
question is to return to the theoretical basis of the analytic models to refine the particular link between
theory and practice in the translation from material form to model of space. The challenge can be
formulated as such: most models used to verify configurational analysis empirically are inconsistent
or contradictory to their theoretical explanation. Conversely, the theoretical argumentation for models
makes use of cases and models that are not directly translatable to the ones used in analytical practice.
3. MODEL BASED REASONING IN (SCIENTIFIC) DISCOVERY
Even if exact definitions vary between disciplines, ‘models’ generally share some principles in that
they are abstracted representations intended to investigate or clarify principles and relations (Downes,
2011; Sugden, 2000; McCarty, 2008). They have an indirect relation to ‘reality’ (Magnani et al., 1999)
as well as to theory. Hanson and Hillier (1987) points to the danger of correspondence thinking
between social concepts such as ‘community’ and spatial concepts when trying to implement socially
relevant knowledge into built form all too readily in a 1:1 relation. It is of equal importance to not
confuse the isovist for vision, or to assume the relevance and empirical validity of any model to mean
that it ‘exists’ in the lived and perceived in the same shape and form as found in the model. Gilles
Châtelet (2000) provides the example of pressure lines in water as true but non-existent: if one would
be able to create a surface in a jar of water after a drawn pressure line, water would indeed provide
pressure on it as the mathematical-diagrammatical gesture of the pressure line suggests. In that sense
they are ‘true’—but in practice there are no pressure lines of that kind, save that all conceivable
pressure lines ‘exist’ simultaneously. They are simultaneously both true and unreal, but enable deeper
understanding and explanation of water pressure phenomena (see also Svetlova, 2015).
From the same point of view, whether an axial line exists is inconsequential on the one hand, but
important on the other. They do not need to ‘exist’ in any common sense of the word to be valid for
modelling but like pressure lines they ‘exist’ without ‘being there’—yet nothing in their existence in
that sense that will validate or invalidate their relevance. This is the position I take in this article: the
‘real existence’ or ‘truth’ of the analytical models is not a point of inquiry. Rather, considered as
models for scientific discovery and methods to expand, explore and strengthen our understanding of
relations between space and society, they are remarkably productive and can feed into many empirical
as well as theoretical challenges as well as generate even contradictory theories and explanations (see
for instance Montello (2007) and Seamon (2015)) because they hold a particular intermediate position
between ‘theory’ and ‘reality’.
With this said, it is important to acknowledge that models need to be comparable for results to be
comparable, which depending on question puts demands on their internal as well as interrelated
logical consistency. Examining trends in building depth as Manum (2006) and Peponis (2012) or
between homes as Hanson (1998) has done, for instance, requires consistent modelling within the
sample to ensure that found differences are not simply differences in modelling techniques. This has
been further elaborated in-depth by Stavroulaki et al (2017), Berghauser Pont et al. (2017), and
Marshall et al. (2018) in investigating differences in geographical information in different cities and
what this means for translating existing geographical models to configurative models. The question is
what constitutes consistent modelling.
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If we insist on the status of the model in research to be neither the ideal of theory or direct
representations of ‘the real’ (Knoespel, 1999; 2002), there is ground to continuously refine and verify
the varied set of models’ ranges of validity. That is, to develop knowledge by treating configurational
and spatial models of syntax research as models in a wider set of research—as intermediate, medium,
testing ground, and translation between theory, ‘reality’, experiment, validation, explanation, and
challenge; i.e. as sites of interrogation, explanation and discovery (Raisis, 1999), where models hold
“a ternary relationship in which it mediates epistemologically, between modeler and modeled,
researcher and data or theory and the world” (McCarty, 2008, p.255). As such intermediates, models
form a particular kind of hypothesis-making, testing, and site of experimentation: as being
abstractions they always discard information in order to investigate chosen aspects of something.
These abstractions are not better or worse depending on detail, complexity or direct correspondence
with ‘reality’, but depending on their explanatory power (I here do not differentiate between
explanation and understanding) of chosen aspects and interrelations (see e.g. Sugden, 2000; Godfrey-
Smith, 2006; Downes, 2011).
To a certain extent, space syntax is a school example hereof, in its oscillation between (informed or
hypothesised) speculative modelling, discovery of phenomena in the model and ‘reality’, investigation
and validation of relation them in-between, and theoretical development in response to these findings.
As the story goes, the models also largely precede the findings; at least as concerns convex spaces and
axial lines, their initial construction and definition is closer to a model hypothesis or hypothetical
model than an attempt to model directly and accurately human cognition or spatial actions (Hillier and
Hanson, 1984). The field is, however, particular in the sense that its models have an ostensibly direct
relation to the material world and superficially it may seem as an actual mapping thereof. This
apparent closeness between ‘model’ and ‘reality’ is both a strength and a danger, as it might push
thinking towards that the more the model resembles the totality of reality the better it would be. From
such a perspective, one must be clear what it is that is being modelled, as well as how this is
understood.
4. MODELLING THE INQUIRY: SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND (POST)STRUCTURALISM
After a period of operating closely with systems theory, it has lately been acknowledged that the roots
of space syntax might primarily be found in (post)structuralist thought (Hillier and Hanson, 1984).
These theoretical bodies share traits but have different fundaments. Systems theory and
(post)structuralism agree that the meaning, role, importance, or character of any part of a system or
structure is defined by its position in the relational structure. However, what constitutes a unit, how it
finds its place in a system, and how it comes to be to begin with are fundamentally different.
Simplified, one can say that in systems theory, a network is constructed by nodes and links where,
importantly, the nodes pre-exist the system or exist independently of the system no matter how
dependent they are of the same for their character. In (post)structuralism, even though one could speak
of nodes and links, it is rather relations that are investigated, where entities are dependent on the
structure in that they are carved out of the whole through a process of differentiation, and the
processes and structures of differentiation are the key points of inquiry.
To not get stuck in further refining this difference, one can translate the positions into how ‘space’ is
considered into two base hypotheses for research inquiry: the fundamental unit hypothesis and the
procedural differentiation hypothesis. These are not posited randomly but relates distinctly to
linguistic paradigms, just as space syntax rests (uneasily) in linguistic paradigms. But they can also
characterize strands of research within the field: Marcus and Koch (2017) present space syntax as
possible to explain from two sides—the cognitive explanation and the social explanation. While this is
illustrative of tendencies in the field—research linked to cognition tend to adhere closer to systems
theory while research linked to sociology tend to tie closer to (post)structuralism—it must be seen
rather as a shorthand for describing how two contradictory positions exist simultaneously, where both
may be valid depending on research inquiry. This points to a pressing question for syntactic research,
in that it investigates relations between an individual and its actions, perceptions, and possibilities in
relation to the environment on the one hand, and on how two or several individuals understand,
express, negotiate and navigate their interrelations through encounters and avoidances in the
environment on the other, where links between need further refinement. It is my position here that one
is not a special case of the other, but that they are interrelated as it comes to theorizing, modelling,
analyzing, navigating, experiencing and cognizing architecture; the way we structure information
about architecture incorporates always-already our understanding of how architecture relates us to
others, and others to each other.
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Simplified to syntactic research practice, the question that grows forth is whether for instance ‘convex
space’ is a unit that pre-exists its being defined by boundaries or if it grows forth as a result of spatial
differentiation. This includes how space is conceptualised in architectural design where different
architectural traditions would be posited differently (e.g. Hillier, 1996; Forty, 2000; Emmons, 2006),
but also how we interpret research findings as well as how we relate to modelling practice not only of
individual units but of spatial configurations. If we again simplify the query, the question can be
posed as whether one navigates a building by understanding how its units (‘spaces’) are composed
into a system of rooms, or by understanding how the building’s volume has been differentiated into
‘rooms’ by material boundaries. Any answer puts the demands on research and modelling differently.
A well-established example of such modelling challenges concerns how to divide Mies van der
Rohe’s Barcelona pavilion into convex spaces. By the base definition of convex space maps it might
seem impossible (Psarra, 2009); an impossibility that is interrelated to how Benedikt (1979) shows
that while it is possible to identify a minimal set of isovists to form an interconnected circuit of
visibility, there is no way to define just where the origins of these isovists should be. Similarly, the
pavilion can be found to be configured by a certain number of convex spaces linked into a certain
configuration, but we cannot define just where one space begins and the other ends. We can also look
at the analysis of the Rolex Learning Center by Marcela Aragüez and Sophia Psarra (2017) to find an
architecture that poses theoretical challenges for how to model which increase the more one insists on
identifying specifically these boundaries, as spaces are defined by an undulating landscape floor and
unclear boundaries in terms of visibility and permeability. As Miranda and Koch (2013) show, there is
no self-evident ‘best’ here although systemic principles or relative measurements seem to perform
closest to manually drawn convex maps. But as they point out, more consistent testing is needed that
ought also be against other material like for example observations of occupation, interview data (e.g.
Giuliani, 1987) or social organisation mapping (Markus, 1993; Dovey, 2008).
That is, if one’s concern is finding a specific line separating two spaces, one might find it is, indeed,
geometrically sometimes impossible. This does not exclude the possibility to define an organization of
least number of spaces to describe a system, and their interrelations. That is, we can extract an
organization without having definite boundaries of the units. This can of course be problematic if the
question is in which space a particular activity takes place—but it may also be informative:
architecture with many zones that could fall into different ‘convexes’ is different from one with few.
This question of boundaries and units can be further understood via Heinrich Wölfflin’s writings
concerning Rembrandt’s painting style.
“Within Rembrandt’s work, there is a distinct development. Thus the early Diana Bathing is
still modelled throughout in a (relatively) plastic style with curved lines following the
separate form: in the late female nudes, on the other hand, little is used but flat lines. In the
first case, the figure stands out; in the later compositions, on the other hand, it is embedded in
the totality of the space-creating tones.” (Wölfflin 1950, p.23)
Wölfflin argues that the change in style is not a question of painting technique or poorer eye-sight as
much as a change in how Rembrandt views the motif. In the earlier work, rather than having more
precision or detail, aspects like the outline or contours of people are foregrounded and exaggerated.
There are shadows and lines around the bodies that from a photorealistic point of view do not exist, as
well as lighting effects that do not follow from the situation but ensure the reading of each individual
body as separate. On this basis, Wölfflin argues that in the early works, Rembrandt was concerned
with people as ‘essential units’, individuals pre-existing the event and independent thereof
subsequently gathered into the depicted situation, shown by how they are articulated and exaggerated
as separate entities artistically. Conversely, in the latter works Wölfflin argues that Rembrandt is
concerned with people as intrinsically defined and subjugated to the situation, artistically expressed in
vague boundaries and fleeting transitions from one to the other, where shadow, light and colour is
used to sometimes make difficult to read where one person begins and another ends. Wölfflin’s
attempts to translate the reasoning to architecture tend to take rather simplistic forms and is therefore
not the point (see Koch, 2007)2, and neither is whether Wölfflin is right or not regarding Rembrandt’s
development. The point is how it highlights how the difference in definition of involved elements and
2 Rather than look at the appearance of boundaries through their material formulation (such as walls), one could look at the
boundary character through how configurative structures appear with easily definable boundaries or in transition zones or other
forms—acknowledging that from a modelling perspective a linear boundary can appear whether there is a wall or not. This
inquiry leads further into how one relates to the individual topological units and their location and extension in the plan, map, or
diagram that is their origins.
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their boundaries can be understood as defined by as well as defining the understanding of the whole.
Do we read configuration as a question of the ‘linear’ (composition of entities/spaces) or the
‘painterly’ (differentiation of a whole)?
The point here is not the boundary in its material formulation, but the demands the underlying notion
of the motif and the unit puts on its mode and precision of definition as well as how it affects and is
affected by the understanding of that which is modelled. If one must be able to precisely outline the
contours of the unit, because the unit is the basis of analysis, then precision in modelling concerns
their precise boundaries; both exact location of the boundary and specific definition of the unit must
be clear. If one is concerned with differentiation that is interdependent and fleeting in boundaries, then
the question is less concerned with precisely defining boundaries and the analysis can be satisfied
with identifying the number of elements and their relational structures. This is not to suggest that the
boundary would not matter in the latter case, but it would only matter in altering the interrelation of
elements. This has two further implications. One is that different theoretical positions would
necessitate or dismiss attempts to define exact boundaries. This includes theoretical position in
systems theory or post-structuralism on the one hand, but also (and interlinked) theoretical position
concerning space and its mode of definition on the other. Whether to impose linear boundaries or not
would either relate to the research inquiry or ontological position of the research(er). As follows from
Wölfflin’s argument, how one relates to these boundaries reflects how one understands [space]. The
other is that for certain kinds of work such an act would be violent, in that it enforces upon an
architectural work an interpretation that is contradictory to its artistic intents.
Rather than uniformly resolving the problem by enforcing a particular form of boundary it is then
possible to internalize the challenge as a qualitative component of the modelling theory and practice
as such (e.g. is the architecture of clearly defined or fuzzy (geometrical) boundaries). But the
treatment and definition of ‘boundary’ in this sense only deals with part of the problem discussed in
this article.
5. EXAMINING ‘COGNITION’
While the current argument is not directly concerning cognition, cognition has grown an important
body of research on which syntax research has productively developed its theory building. It has seen
a wide use in syntax research set in relation to for instance cognitive maps (Dalton and Bafna, 2003);
as theoretical basis focusing on the cognitive logic of turns and vistas by Peponis (2012); in relation to
Gibson’s (1986) theory of affordances by Marcus (2018); Hillier and Iida (2005) substantiating the
link via statistically testing movement flows against configurational measures; Dalton’s (2005)
research into cognition and navigation; investigations of isovists as egocentric representations by Emo
(2017); or Penn (2003) addressing the axial line as a cognitive element. Unresolved differences them
in-between seem productive ground for future research, but acknowledging them is important since
while cognition concerns links between mental processing of information and material spatial
structure, it is not an argument for a particular form of perception or, for that matter, a particular type
of spatial cognition (egocentric, allocentric; Hillier 2003; further Portugali, 2011). Neither is it the
case that just because an individual unit can be argued for in one of these perspectives, that this is
necessarily the explanation in all instances of their (systemic) use.
Cognition concerns the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through
thought, experience, and the senses. In this sense, cognition is ‘individual’ and there is a range of
ways in which this makes it valid to distinguish from ‘the social’ while simultaneously impossible.
However, to leap from this observation to that cognition concerns individuals is premature in several
ways. As argued by for instance Tversky (2003), it needs to be recognized that spatial cognition is
situational in that it depends on ‘why’ cognition operates. Tversky writes about the different ‘spaces
of the body’ as space around the body, space of navigation and space of graphics. In a similar vein,
Richter, Winter and Santosa (2011) show how amount of detail in mental spatial representations differ
according to purpose and stages of a journey so that the cognitive map of a campus layout may
operate as simply ‘campus’ for large part of a journey to a campus and only be further refined once
having arrived on-site. They show how changes in such granularity in cognition is not directly or
gradually related to closeness but can happen in distinct shifts, meaning that technically inconvenient
routes are used since the layout of, in this case, the campus might not be considered before arrival
leading to what in utilitarian terms might be a detour. Koch (2005) further demonstrates how objects
of the same type and scale—e.g. bookcases that blocks sight—have demonstrably different impact on
movement patterns in different public libraries, indicating that the relation between architectural
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articulation (‘the building’) and internal furnishing varies, though it remains to be answered if it
depends on subordination of ordering or relative information structures; do the bookcases have effect
because their arrangement deviates or conforms to the structural logic of the library, or because in one
case the building offers clear and concise support for orientation and not in the other?
From a cognitive perspective, it might therefore be said that ‘inconsistent’ object scale is cognitively
consistent modelling, if the difference in included boundaries correspond to the same type of cognitive
action. That is, if cognition serves to interpret boundaries in the environment dynamically depending
on both intent and environment to construct an understanding of the space of affordances or
navigation in a given situation, and if a ‘typical’ case of walking engages with building boundaries in
one environment and pedestrian path boundaries in another, then the model would be consistent from
a cognitive perspective if it responded to these changes. This is not the same as whether people
actually follow these boundaries or not. Just as the validity of the axial line as such is not dependent
on people actually walking along it in a direct sense.
To engage with this relative ground of boundary definition and indeterminacy I think it is of interest
to raise the cognitive notion of salience. Salience stand for, in short, the emergence of shared and
reoccurring ways of relating to and conceptualizing the world and is used in cognition for instance as
concerns categories. A category is salient if it is shared by many and/or reoccur pervasively. Salience
is thus not a matter of correctness but if something is embedded in cognition in a culture. For example,
it has been shown how different cultures differ in how they structure categories of trees in both degree
and kind of differentiation (Dougherty, 1978). A difference that is not only one of naming species, but
of cognitively recognizing them as different or not. As cognition is mental processing of information,
and memory is a dynamic and active faculty that restructures itself continuously (Kaye, 2000;
Bondolilo and Pillemer, 2015; see further Koch, 2017a), it is only reasonable that the same is true for
spatial information. From this perspective, it is additionally reasonable that information is transformed
depending on level of knowledge and familiarity with a particular environment as well as with similar
environments in general. Thus, cognition suggests we need to investigate differentiated ways of
modelling and of interpreting results, not only as egocentric or allocentric spatial understanding (and
lately altercentric; Surtees et al., 2013), but as cognition treating space differently depending on
situation, purpose, degrees of familiarity and cultural conditioning. This is not only in the
sociogeometric or ‘use’ sense but in how the models are structured as well as the role of a subject or
body within them, as introduced in the previous section.
This posits cognition interconnected to four different conditions. (1) Cultural differences in what
information to include or discard as spatial differentiators, (2) Differences in architectural cultures that
impact the same, (3) Differences in the material formations and what type and amount of support it
provides for cognitive processing, and (4) Differences in the situation and purpose from which
cognition is operating. This is not a query that is resolved through further detail, or through the use of
one model type or the other. How would one then move from such a position towards solidifying
modelling practice?
6. ARCHITECTURE CULTURE
Architecture as built structure is a cultural artefact; whether ‘vernacular’ traces of collective habits or
practices, solutions to practical problems, or the result of self-conscious and deliberate design work to
create something specific or unique. As argued both within and outside of syntax theory, it holds an
indirect but strong relation to its inhabitation, be it in how it manages social relations or how it guides
movement and experiences, creates differentiations and structures capacity, control and surveillance.
As such, it is embedded with choices and prioritisations amongst the many different designs that
would solve the problem at hand, where any solution by necessity includes prioritising amongst
conflicting goals and possibilities yet allows a lot of freedom in subsequent use (Krippendorff 2006).
Looking at architecture as culture in a historical and regional as well as in an aesthetic sense, priorities
are different as are their modes of realisation. Such an ostensibly ‘functional’ thing as vernacular
homes, cannot be explained based on ‘functional’ or ‘basic’ needs, as even if they in some senses do
respond to such, the way they do so differ radically depending on the social and cultural conditions of
their becoming:
“Contemporary literary and sociological studies of people’s homes were unearthing a wealth
of evidence that space configuration featured in British society in surprising, and often
unexpected ways, as a means of social and cultural identification. The manifest variety of
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ordinary people’s lifestyles seemed to point away from behavioural universals and basic
human needs towards a view that, if space had a purpose, this was to encode and transmit
cultural information.” (Hanson, 1998, 109)
The same could be said of many other types of buildings, such as factories, schools, and even whole
cities (e.g. Peponis 1985, 2017). The somewhat unstated issue here, intentional or not, that I intend to
unpack is the relation of this statement to architecture being culture. Hanson’s statement thereby
means that one of the purposes of [architecture] space is to encode and transmit architecture. That is,
if architecture is culture then one of the roles of architecture is to encode and transmit itself, which
may sound a tautology but I will argue it definitely is not. Rather, as intrinsically linking the material
and the social, architecture serves to encode and transmit information of its own state of being, its
purposes, its rules and uses, and its modes of operation. From a spatial configuration perspective, it
communicates how it articulates differentiations and spatial divisions, and what kind of articulations
formulate spatial boundaries.3
This is not saying that the role is to communicate itself in terms of the meaning of a particular
building—just as Hanson is not saying that it is the particular values of a particular family
constellation that is communicated. It rather operates on another more indirect and arguably more
structural level of meaning. From a linguistic point of view, one could argue that it communicates
principles of differentiation and structures of morphemes, of semiotic differentiation of signs, and
syntaxes of combination. Some of these emerge as pervasive or salient, whereas others are less
common and some might be near unique. Relating to a labyrinth is different for one growing up with
labyrinths as a common spatial practice and one who rarely ever encounters one in everyday life.
The suggestion of architecture as culture includes the differentiation of architecture cultures in terms
of how subdivision or definition of space is understood; i.e. is a minor protrusion from the wall such
as a pilaster separating a hall into two spaces or not? It is reasonable that this is relative to both culture
(are pilaster forms used, and are they used to signal spatial differentiation or not?) and context (is it in
the particular architecture an anomaly in otherwise smooth walls?), but also to generic modes of
spatial separation (are walls extensively or sparsely used compared to other territorial markings?). The
balance between spatial formation (shape and geometry of ‘space’) and architectural articulation
(material formulations to indicate difference) in such cultural difference is also likely to vary. The use
of ‘architectural cultures’ here suggests, intentionally, the twofold possibility of this being between
‘cultures’ in a geographical or historical sense (e.g. classical or medieval, European or Mesoamerican,
etc.), or between cultures of architecture such as international style and national romanticism. While
one should be careful to assign causal links between environment, technology and social and spatial
practice (Foucault, 1982; Wigley, 1995) one can investigate how environment-technologies-practices
bundles participate in formation of architecture culture to, arguably, produce ecologies of self-to-
environment relations that are observably different in part related to the material culture of
architectural production.
The suggestion is here rather simple: within certain boundaries conditioned by architectural acts of
creating difference and connectivity, what constitutes a spatial differentiation might vary between
individuals, cultures, and aesthetics, and this means that analysing ‘spatial configuration’ in different
cultures might require different modelling rules. If architecture communicates culture and thereby
itself and its own principles, then what constitutes a boundary is part of this communication. The basis
of syntactic modelling would then need to incorporate analysis of the modes of spatial articulation
active in the architectural culture analysed. But also that there is a culturally dependent scalarity and
layering within which bundles or clusters of spaces are, or can be, treated as singular units. A division
of this kind that is more or less accepted in syntactic research is between ‘buildings’ and ‘public
space’, even though the relevance of this definition depends on cultural factors and the field itself has
demonstrated that there are many cases where additional differentiations of similar kind show both
theoretical and empirical significance.
3 One might here raise the question whether space syntax is intended to avoid embedding cultural differences in the modelling
choices and rather see such emerge as results of analysis. The answer to whether this is possible is both epistemological and
ontological. However, as I understand it from The Social Logic of Space (Hillier and Hanson, 1984), the answer is a distinct no.
The separation between material space and ‘the social’ or ‘use’ is one of methodological and practical necessity, operating
under the fundamental position that space is inherently social and the social inherently spatial for there to be any possibility of
there being an interrelation. This is not, however, to ignore that the success of the methodology is dependent on consistency and
clarity in this separation, or that it is important to avoid arbitrariness in subdivision.
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This links closely to aspects of aesthetics that might tie the discussion together, providing one does
not pretend that it is the response to aesthetics in architecture. Aesthetics not in terms of preference,
but in the sense of positioning of the subject to make a work of art meaningful, and different
aesthetics thereby conditioning different modes of relating to [architecture] (Kaye 2000, Kant 1974,
Koch 2017b). That is, understanding architectural affect to make us relate to it in ways that makes it
make sense, even if what that ‘sense’ is might differ. Drawing from the discussion above,
configuration is also a question of aesthetics, even if one must be careful to not subscribe either
(aesthetics or configuration) to the other, not only in the direct sense but in how it affects and
conditions subjectivity. Some of this aesthetic conditioning is intimately tied to habits (Ballantyne,
2011), constructing relations of self-to-environment embedded in subjectivity as well as action
forming aesthetics in conditioning the subject and its relation to the world over time that establishes a
(as opposed to ‘the’) meaningful relation that includes understandings of self-to-self and self-to-others.
This takes place both in a specific or general sense, and as an adaptive and dynamic ability which
evolve over time that can be (and is) trained. Architecture forms a form of non-discursive training
(Bourdieu, 1984) in capacity to relate to ‘itself’ as specific buildings or environments as well as to
architecture in general.
Claiming the importance of training is not to subscribe to complete relativism. As Judith Butler (1999;
2005) argues concerning identity, while there is no evidence pointing to that there is such a thing as a
pre-existing subject which finds itself and most evidence points towards subjectivity as constructed,
this does not mean that it is ‘false’ or ‘unnatural’. Rather, subjectivity can be a reasonable outcome of
being human in society: as we learn to recognize ‘ourselves’ as actors in the environment as different
from other actors, we incorporate into this understanding of our selves an understanding of how what
‘I’ (that is, one embodied being in the world) am is not the same as another ‘I’ as well as that while
part of the ‘world’, this ‘I’ can also affect or be affected by it. It is reasonable that such subjectivity
includes the environment, and that there are some general logics to this that depend on conditions of
human embodiment and capacities (see e.g. Piaget and Inhelder, 1956; Grosz, 1995; Gibson, 1986;
Holanda, 2017); or, much more simply expressed: it is reasonable that on a very basic level, walls
‘always’ matter, and they matter not only as material boundaries, but because they are extended socio-
spatial material communicative actions.
It is worth noting that in a similar sense, modelling operates related to subjectivities and relations of
self-to-environment and thereby integrates, in a certain sense, aesthetical questions by default. Here,
there is arguably a somewhat uneasy analogous relation between model and architecture. While
analytic models can move towards reducing non-discursive aesthetic influences, this very
incorporation of aesthetics also forms one of the theoretical bases for the necessity to understand that
any model (of architecture) contains a certain integration of aesthetics, which is part in what
necessitates adaption of modelling principles after architectural cultures; as the model is always
already influenced by an aesthetic position in terms of disposition and mode of subjectivity, it needs
to be related to the architecture analysed towards a similar model-work relation in compared cases.
7. ECOLOGIES OF MODELLING
If we insist on looking at the question as one of ecologies—be it in the terms of Gibson’s (1986)
affordances or Guattari’s (2000) three ecologies—one might come closer to a resolution by accepting
that modelling is dependent on inquiry not from a practical perspective or as a result of empirical
practice, but from a theoretical perspective. If affordances are related to cognition (Gibson 1986),
cognition depends on purpose (Tversky, 2003), and perception of what constitutes a boundary is
aesthetically and culturally conditioned, then the model used must depend on investigative purpose. If
these models then respond to different relational ecologies, one can begin to structure theories around
not only which models correspond to which ecologies, but how ostensibly similar models need be
understood differently for different ecologies. I.e., a ‘convex space map’ to read co-presence as basis
for interaction, might need be different from a ‘convex space map’ that describes socio-spatial
organization not only from a practical perspective but from a cognitive-interpretative perspective in
how space is understood by inhabitants for different purposes even though they in a particular
instance may coincide. Similarly, it is possible that there are several versions of axial- and isovist
maps that are ‘correct’ within a larger number of versions that are ‘incorrect’. This is arguably known
in research practice but not made explicit in a theoretically robust manner. Rather, one might criticize
theorizations of models to instead insist on one explanation even when analytical practice deviates
therefrom. This theoretical position suggests, however, a necessity to revisit analytical models and
thoroughly engage with their principles to see just how they respond to which types of purposes.
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From this position, one might consider models of spatial configuration to be part of research theory
and practice in the sense Ekaterina Svetlova (2015, p.70) describes: “models are epistemic artifacts or
tools that are purposely created for particular practical goals and are made productive by means of
human intervention and manipulation within particular scientific practices. The definition of models
as epistemic tools situates them as material objects that are not ‘ready-made’ but rather unfolding
elements of situational practices.” If these epistemic tools, as Downes (2011) notes, hold a ternary
relationship with modeler, theory, and ‘the world’ (where ‘the world’ is often twice remote via
different forms of data) and serve to both mediate and transform in-between, then it is not only
possible but reasonable to consider a range of specific models (of space) to differently approximate
the theoretical position and the investigated object or phenomenon while remaining within the same
‘theory-model-space’. Sugden (2000) further discusses such kinds of relations through the concept of
robustness; that is, models have robust relations if they provide, in principle, the same results as one
another within bounds set by the research inquiry, a concept that can be extended to the relation
between theoretical ‘ideal’ and specific model. One reason for this is the necessity of every model to
be specific in ways the theoretical query or investigated phenomenon might not be—but also that the
transformations enacted in these unfolding situational practices might be what allows knowledge
discovery to begin with (Châtelet, 2000). This is not meant to disqualify research into the specifics
and precision of particular models, but to suggest the more precise this investigation gets the more it
might limit the model’s generic validity, and that within the wider research premise of relations
between spatial configurations and social, cultural, economic, experiential or other phenomena, the
challenge is not to find the universally ‘true’ model, but to identify ranges of validity and relevance of
the different models employed, including their mode of defining spatial limitations (not only
concerning e.g. axial versus convex maps, but also e.g. axial maps considering pedestrian paths
boundaries and axial maps not considering the same), and the theoretical grounds on which they stand
as well as what queries they might respond to. This is where continuous refinement is needed, and
where this article operates. Accepting that analysis making use of spatial units that deviate from
specific definitions is relevant, but insisting that these units need to find a theoretical basis in how
they are constructed that operates not only on an overall theoretical level, but on the level of detail in
which the units themselves are deployed.
8. CONCLUDING WORDS
The argument put forth in this article is that it is only by accepting that there is a plurality of models
within the shared basis of material-spatial configuration that knowledge can be further developed. It is
also by accepting that the theoretical formulation has a specific relation to the various models and the
models have a particular relation to ‘reality’ that the theoretical groundwork can be refined. From
such a position one might then continue to refine models to better respond to different knowledge
challenges and different architectures, while incorporating such development into the strategic
research challenges of syntactic research as formulated in The Social Logic of Space. One might also
investigate what sort of models—and not only measures—turn out as more widely relevant, for which
problem spaces they are so and for which problem spaces the specific choices in their creation become
obscuring or hindering. And, following Sugden (2000), in what situations different models have
robust relations to one another and to theoretical basis in relation to research query. It builds theory
that includes diversity where there may be models that have more generic relevance while other
models are more explanatory for specific research questions. This then becomes an important point of
theorization and empirical inquiry to further develop. Such a position requires theoretical
advancement of what the models are, but also of where we would find breaking points where the
proxy becomes invalid by virtue of deviating too far from that which one intends to investigate. This
is not a question of simply whether it provides correlations or not, but of whether the correlations (or
non-correlations) provide answers to the research question at hand, and whether these correlations
can be ascribed to the properties which one purports to investigate the influence of or relation in-
between.
The argument does suggest, however, that there are important questions regarding not only ‘space’,
but the differentiation and definition of space into units for graph analysis—and the relation between
space and boundary—that needs further investigation, where operations on existing models or by
means of different measures on the same will not provide answers. It also suggests that such research
needs to again approach the uneasy relation between configuration and geometry and engage with
what geometries should affect such differentiation, in what situations, under what circumstances, and
for what purposes. It further suggests that releasing the models from a state as being absolute, there
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are possibilities to more solidly engage with different models as proxies of both one another and of
theoretical or principal research inquiries.
But it also points to that there are fundamental theoretical differences between models, that may make
use of one type for research into certain challenges more or less invalid, while the most appropriate
for research into other challenges. The question of ‘for what purpose’ is put at the forefront with its
theoretical foundation, just as the situated context of the model as related to the research inquiry. As
stated initially, this article does not presume to resolve all of these questions and provide a singular
theoretical solution; the intention is rather to draw out a theoretical problem space and examine
directions through which unresolved modelling and analytic questions might come to be resolved,
while at least suggesting how they could be as well as what remains to be researched in order to do
that.
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